# Theoretical Models of Social Cognition and Mentalisation ## 2.2. Theoretical Models of Social Cognition and Mentalisation An understanding of how individuals represent and interpret others’ mental states is central to both empathy and mentalisation. This section reviews three major theoretical models of social cognition: Theory-Theory, Simulation Theory, and dual-process models, and considers their relevance to narrative fiction and its potential role in supporting social-cognitive functions. ### 2.2.1. Theory-Theory and Its Relevance to Mentalisation Although originally developed in the context of ToM research, Theory-Theory can provide a framework for understanding others’ mental states (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Perner, 1993). While Theory-Theory accounts for and is supported by developmental milestones, it has received criticism for underestimating the intuitive and emotional aspects of social cognition (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). The assumption that individuals act as researchers who do conscious hypothesis-testing rather than relying on automatic processes has been challenged especially by Simulation Theory researchers (Goldman, 2006; Gordon, 1986). From Theory-Theory theory’s perspective, exposure to narrative fiction may serve as a source of data through the characters’ differing mental states, and a playground for observation and hypothesis-testing which helps individuals refine their theories (Mar & Oatley, 2008). Seen through the lens of mentalisation, Theory-Theory captures only one pole of the process: the explicit, rule-guided reasoning we deploy when we consciously interpret behaviour. Mentalisation frameworks extend this by adding an implicit, emotion-laden mode that relies on embodied simulation and intuitive “felt sense” understanding (Fonagy et al., 2002). Thus, while Theory-Theory frameworks explain how readers consciously analyse plots and motives in literary fiction, mentalisation literature highlights how those same stories evoke immersive identification that trains automatic perspective-taking (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008; Ryan, 2001). Integrating Theory-Theory into a broader mentalisation model therefore preserves its strengths in accounting for reflective, cognitively effortful mindreading, while situating it alongside complementary intuitive and affective processes essential for real-world social understanding. The limitations that Theory-Theory faces in capturing these automatic, experiential aspects of mind-reading naturally lead to the alternative account offered by Simulation Theory, which is addressed in the following section. ### 2.2.2. Simulation Theory and Narrative Fiction Simulation Theory offers an alternative view to Theory-Theory by suggesting that people do not navigate their social worlds like scientists consciously testing hypotheses and forming theories, that instead they use their own minds as simulators, enacting what others might be thinking or feeling by putting themselves in their shoes (Goldman, 2006). In other words, individuals replicate others’ mental states within their cognitive and affective systems. Within the mentalisation framework, this simulation route corresponds to the implicit, experiential pole that complements the explicit, theory-driven reasoning emphasised by Theory-Theory (Fonagy et al., 2002). The origins of Simulation Theory can be traced back to philosophical discussions on imagination and empathy (Gordon, 1986), which later gained traction in cognitive science through the discovery of mirror neurons, neurons which activate both when taking an action and observing another taking the same action (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). The existence of these neurons in monkeys and humans alike provided strong biological evidence for the perspective that simulation plays a significant role in social cognition (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). As for emotive responses, when an individual sees someone else smile, frown, or exhibit distress, they involuntarily simulate these emotions by activating related neural system, which allows them to “feel into” the other personal, forming a grasp of the other’s internal mental state without engaging in explicit reasoning (Gallese, 2001). This is especially crucial with regards to affective empathy, the ability to resonate emotionally with others, while still being important for cognitive empathy, helping individuals construct an understanding of what others may be experiencing (Goldman & Sripada, 2005). From this theory’s perspective, exposure to fiction may facilitate individuals to mentally simulate the emotional and cognitive experiences of the characters, often without conscious effort on their part. Fiction, then, becomes a means for simulation, where readers enact the mental states of the various characters present (Mar & Oatley, 2008; Oatley, 1999). This helps explain why fiction, despite being detached from real events, can have empathic and mentalising effects, since being factual is not a precondition to engaging readers emotionally or cognitively. Instead, what matters is the psychological realism and the richness of mental states in the work of fiction. To this end, narrative transportation has been found to be an important factor, as the more the reader is absorbed in a story, the more impactful the simulation (Green & Brock, 2000). Consequently, Simulation Theory highlights the automatic, emotion-laden side of mentalisation that is exercised every time a reader or viewer is “transported” into a narrative world. As for the critics of Simulation Theory, they argue that simulation theory cannot account for the entirety of social cognition, as there are situations in which individuals understand others’ mental states without necessarily sharing their emotions or thoughts, and that simulation can be undesirable in some situations as it may lead to egocentric biases (Apperly, 2012). ### 2.2.3. Dual-Process Models of Automatic and Reflective Mentalisation The valid criticism for both Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory has given rise to dual-process models, which argue they operate together with different functions. Dual process models propose that Simulation Theory explains the automatic, intuitive system of social cognition, while Theory-Theory accounts for the conscious and effortful side of social cognition (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). This division maps neatly onto the implicit–explicit spectrum of mentalisation described by Lieberman (2007) and elaborated by Fonagy and Luyten (2009). For instance, upon observing an individual frown, individuals may automatically simulate their experience without making use of explicit reasoning (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Goldman, 2006). Such automatic resonance aligns with what Fonagy and colleagues term “pre-reflective” mentalising (Fonagy et al., 2002). However, when faced with more complex or ambiguous situations, individuals may use their previous knowledge, beliefs about such situations, and abstract, deliberate reasoning to analyse what others think or intend (Apperly, 2012). This deliberate system is often employed when the intuitive system fails, such as when interpreting irony, sarcasm, deceit, or encountering individuals who behave in ways that are outside of social norms (Apperly, 2012). Evidence for this duality comes from the study of Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), in which infants as young as 15 months display signs of implicit mentalising, well before they are able to pass explicit false-belief tasks. Furthermore, narrative fiction may in fact engage both systems. As Oatley (1999) and Mar and Oatley (2008) suggest, literary fiction often evokes emotions through simulation of the characters’ mental states, and deliberate perspective-taking and abstract reasoning through complex characters and plotlines. This dual engagement helps explain why fiction, despite its fictional status, can enhance empathy and mentalisation: psychological realism and mental-state richness, rather than factual accuracy, determine its social-cognitive impact. ### 2.2.4. Demographic Correlates of Social-Cognitive and Affective Capacities Social-cognitive outcomes such as mentalisation and empathy, together with affective domains like anxiety and meaning-making, vary systematically with demographic factors. Sex differences are well documented: women score higher than men on self-reported empathy (McDonald & Kanske, 2023) and trait anxiety (McLean & Anderson, 2009), yet show only a small or inconsistent advantage in ToM performance (McDonald & Kanske, 2023; Greenberg et al., 2023). Age effects emerge as cognitive empathy and ToM peak in early adulthood, whereas emotional empathy remains stable across adulthood (Grühn et al., 2008). Education and intellectually enriching activities (e.g., extensive reading, higher academic attainment) are positively associated with perspective-taking (Mar & Oatley, 2008) and, in large epidemiological studies, predict lower odds of generalised anxiety (Bjelland et al., 2008). Socio-economic factors likewise shape these capacities. Financial hardship reliably elevates anxiety and psychological distress (Richardson et al., 2017), and socio-economic status modulates social cognition: lower-income individuals show different patterns of empathic accuracy and perspective-taking than their higher-income peers, indicating that resource context influences mentalisation (Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010). Finally, students and early-career adults (typical of the 18-to-30 age range) exhibit elevated trait and state anxiety (about 40 per cent screening above clinical cut-offs, with women significantly more likely than men to do so) yet remain highly malleable in socio-cognitive development (Ahmed et al., 2023; Luyten et al., 2020). These demographic trends underscore the need to control for individual differences in narrative-based social-cognition research.